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President Reagan signed into law the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 (OTCA) on August 23, 1988.1 Included within this
law were provisions addressing authority for trade agreements, 2 section
301 remedies, 3 section 2014 escape clause, antidumping5 and countervailing duties6 as well as amendments to the Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act (FCPA).7 Additionally, export control provisions were included in this
law as part of the Export Enhancement Act of 1988.8 This comprehensive
law was the culmination of a lengthy process over several years which
included hearings; debates; negotiation among House and Senate leaders
and the President; and one Presidential veto.9 The amendments to the
FCPA9 were sandwiched into the lengthy and more controversial provi* Assistant Professor of Law, Bentley College. B.A., 1972 University of Pennsylvania; J.D., 1976 Boston University.
IThe Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act [hereinafter OTCA], Pub. L.
No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107 (1988) (signed by President Reagan on August 23,
1988). For a timely discussion of the overall impact of the Act, see Holmer &
Bello, The 1988 Trade Bill: Savior or Scourge of the InternationalTrading System," 23 INT'L LAW 523 (1989).
1Id.See generally Applebaum & Kaplan, U.S. Trade Law and Policy, 408 PRAC.
L. INST. (1987) (for background on trade law); Applebaum & Schlitt, The New
Trade Law, 482 PRAc. L. INST. (1988) (for overview of OTCA) [hereinafter SchlittP.L.I.].
3OTCA, amending the Trade Act, 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (1974); also added a new
section 182 providing "[i]dentification of countries that deny adequate protection
or market access for intellectual property rights".
OTCA, 19 U.S.C. § 2253 (a)(3). See generally, Schlitt-P.L.I., supra note 2, at
206 (discussion of amendment).
'OTCA, §§ 1316, 1318-1320, 102 Stat. 1107, 1186-92 (amending Title VII of
the Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. §§ 1677. See generally Schlitt-P.L.I., supra note
2, at 27-31.
OTCA, §§ 1312-1314, 102 Stat. 1107, 1184-85.
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78 m(b), dd-1, dd-2, ff (1982)
[hereinafter FCPA]; OTCA, §§ 5001-5003, 102 Stat. 1107, 1415 (to be codified at
15 U.S.C. §§ 78 m(b), 78 dd-1, 78 dd-2 (1988)).
This legislation also abolished the "Eckhardt Amendment" 15 U.S.C. §§ 78 dd2 (b)(3), ff (c)(3) (1982), which required that a corporation be found guilty of
violating the FCPA before any individual within the corporation could be prosecuted. The repeal of this section clears the way for more individual prosecutions.
' Berlack, Analysis of the Amendments to the Export Admistration Act of 1979
Contained in the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, 482 PRAc. L.
INST. 315 (1988).
9Hirschhorn, ForeignCorruptPracticesAct: Narrowed,Significantly Clarified,
NAT'L L. J. Dec. 26, 1988 - Jan. 2, 1989, at 16. See also, Sweeney & Macintosh,
Proposed Amendments to the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 2 REV. INT'L
Bus. L. 175, 184 (1988) (discussion of Presidential veto).
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sions of the OTCA, thus escaping significant public scrutiny.' 0 This paper
will examine the 1977 FCPA and the 1988 amendments thereto and
assesses their impact on effectuating the original purpose of the FCPA
which was to insure that corporations act ethically by prohibiting bribery
on an international level."
The FCPA was passed in 1977 in response to revelations during Watergate era investigations that "slush funds" were used to pay illegal
campaign contributions as well as to bribe foreign officials in pursuit of
business opportunities. 12 Pursuant to a Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) investigation, one company was charged with paying over
$59 million dollars to government officials in Italy. 13 Congress sought to
14
change corporate behavior by enacting this statute.
The original FCPA was divided into accounting standards and antibribery sections.' 5 The accounting section required an "issuer"'16 of securities to keep detailed records'7 and internal accounting controls 8 "to
reflect the transactions". 0 This was a record keeping requirement. Secondly, "issuers" were prohibited from directly or indirectly paying or
giving anything of value to a foreign official in order to influence or to
obtain, retain or direct business. 20 The section defined "foreign official"
to exclude employees whose duties were "essentially ministerial or cler2
ical." '

10 Hippler & Bello, The 1988 Trade bill: is it protectionist?, 5 INT'L TRADE REP.
(BNA) 1347, 1347-1351 (1988).
11Fadimen, A Traveler's Guide to Gifts and Bribes, HARV. Bus. REV., July-Aug.
1986, at 122, 122-36; Gevurtz, Using the antitrustlaws to combat Overseas Bribery
by Foreign Companies:A step to even the odds in InternationalTrade, 27 VA. J.
INT'L L. 211 (1987), reprinted in 1987 CORP. PRAC. COMM. 139, 139-200; Longobardi, Reviewing the Situation: What is to be done with the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act?, 20 VAND. J. OF TRANSNAT'L L. 431, 431-494 (1987); Surrey, The
Foreign Corrupt PracticesAct: Let the Punishment fit the Crime, HARV. INT'L L.
J. 293 (1979); Sweeney & Macintosh, supra note 9, at 175-194.
12Fadimen, supra note 11, at 123. See also Kurkjian & Kelly, The Meese Case
and a Little Used Law on Bribes Abroad, Boston Globe, April 3, 1988, at 3, col.
1. See generally Timmeny, An Overview of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act,
SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & CoM. L. REV. 235 (1982); Wade, An Examination of the
Provisionsand Standardsof the FCPA, 9 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 255 (1982).
13Fadimen, supra note 11, at 123 (explaining that "[A] second allegedly paid
$4 million to a political party in South Korea. A third [company] reportedly
provided $450,000 in gifts to Saudi generals. A fourth [company] may have diverted $377,000 to fly plane loads of voters to the Cook Islands to rig elections
there"). See also Longobardi, supranote 11, at 433 (discussion of existing business
practices).
,4But cf. Kurkjian & Kelly, supra note 12. The authors discuss the fact that
a
whole series of publicly held corporations were not covered by the act's
requirements that businesses file accurate records with the SEC. This
was "because they are covers for the CIA." The statute allows companies to avoid keeping accurate records if they are carrying out a
mission of "national security" on behalf of the president.

Id.

15FCPA, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78 m(b), dd-1, dd-2, ff (1982).
16 15 U.S.C. § 78 m(b)(2).

Id.
Id.

17
18

19 Id.

20FCPA,

15 U.S.C. §§ 78 m(b), dd-1, dd-2, ff (1982).
21 Id.
at dd-l(b).
https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol37/iss4/4
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The antibribery section applied to both "issuers" of securities as well
22
This section caused great confusion among
as to "domestic concerns.."
corporations because of the vagueness of its provisions: For example, what

23
did it mean to corruptly use the mail or an "instrumentality of com24
merce"? Section 103 also made it unlawful if a person "[knew] or [had]
reason to know . . ." that the "bribe" was being offered directly or indi-

25
rectly "for the purposes of obtaining, retaining ...or directing business."
Enforcement of the antibribery sections was shared by the SEC and
the Department of Justice. 26 The SEC had responsibility for the enforcement of the accounting provisions. 27 Accounting violations carried sanctions of up to five years in prison and a $100,000 fine, while violations
of the foreign bribery section earned sanctions of up to $1 million in
corporate fines and, for a willful individual violator, five years in prison
disclosure
and a $10,000 fine. 28 The authors of the legislation believed that
29
requirements would protect the corporation's shareholders.
There has been substantial criticism of this law because, since its inception, there has been little international movement toward the United
States position nor has there been an agreement on an international

treaty.3 0 Thus the perception that American businesses were at a com-

petitive disadvantage persisted. 3 1 Then President Carter attempted to
improve the situation by calling for guidelines which would assist corporations.32 Instead, the Department of Justice established a review procedure.33 Under this procedure a company was required to disclose a
significant amount of information before it could receive a decision, which
has proven to be a disincentive in itself. It was reported that less than
20 reviews were ever undertaken.

34

35
Since 1980, there have been numerous bills filed to amend the FCPA.
some
that
During the 100th Congress, there was unanimous agreement
action needed to be taken to rectify these problems but no agreement
between the Houses on specifically what should be done. One commentator counted over twelve bills submitted to Congress.3 6 However, none
were able to muster support of both the House and the Senate.
22

Id.

23Id.

- Id.
25FCPA, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78 m(b), dd-1, dd-2, ff (1982).
26
Id.
27
Id.
28
Id.
29 See generally Longobardi, supra note 11.
0
Id.at 493. Contra, Fadimen, supra note 11, at 136 (heading suggests that
good ethics equals good business). Compare Pastin & Hooker, Ethics and the
Foreign CorruptPracticesAct, BUSINESS ETHICS 463 (M. Hoffman & J. Moore eds.
1984) with Longobardi, supra note 11 and Fadimen, supra note 11.
31 Cf. Gevurtz, supra note 11. Even the title of the article, Using the Antitrust
Laws to Combat OverseasBribery by Foreign Companies: A Step to Even the Odds
in International Trade, suggests the need to even the race between American
companies saddled with compliance with the FCPA and the other nations who
may freely bribe.
32Longobardi, supra note 11, at 462.
33Id.
14 Id. at 465.
s-See generally sources cited supra notes 9 and 11.
11, at 449.
Longobardi, supra note1989
Published by36EngagedScholarship@CSU,
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While almost every country considers bribery of its own officials a crime,
"[N]o nation other than the U.S. prohibits bribery of another country's
officials or bribery occurring outside it own territory. 37 Other countries,
including Switzerland, West Germany and other developed countries,
even allow tax deductions for certain illegal payments."
At the 100th Congress there was substantial disagreement between
the House and the Senate regarding what amendments to the FCPA were
required.39 Both the House and Senate sponsored trade bills on the floor,
such as H.R. 3, with amendments to the FCPA President Reagan vetoed
the legislation on May 24, 1988, but not specifically because of the FCPA
amendments. The Congress40enacted a compromise which the President
signed on August 23, 1988.
The final version of the FCPA Amendments and its changes may be
summarized into five categories.
1. Recordkeeping and accounting
2. Permissible payments
3. Antibribery and Reason to Know Standard
(Affirmative Defenses)
4. Increased penalties
5. Executive Branch Responsibilities.
An exegesis of the above-mentioned sections follows.
I. RECORDKEEPING AND ACCOUNTING

Section 13(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. §
78m (b)) has been amended by adding sections 4, 5, 6 and 7.41 These
'aGevurtz, supra note 11, at 140 n.4 (citing numerous other sources).
31 Id. at 141 n.10 (noting that Switzerland and "most developed countries" do
allow a deduction for illegal overseas payments).
31Sweeney & Macintosh, supra note 9.
40Id. at 175.
4'The

additional sections read as follows:
(4) No criminal liability shall be imposed for failing to comply with
the requirements ofparagraph (2) of this subsection except as provided

in paragraph (5) of this subsection.
(5) No person shall knowingly circumvent or knowingly fail to implement a system of internal accounting controls or knowingly falsify
any book, record, or account described in paragraph (2).
(6) Where an issuer which has a class of securities registered pursuant to section 12 of this title or an issuer which is required to file
reports pursuant to section 15(d) of this title holds 50 per centum or
less of the voting power with respect to a domestic or foreign firm,
the provisions of paragraph (2) require only that the issuer proceed
in good faith to use its influence, to the extent reasonable under the
issuer's circumstances, to cause such domestic or foreign firm to devise
and maintain a system of internal accounting controls consistent with
paragraph (2). Such circumstances include the relative degree of the
issuer's ownership of the domestic or foreign firm and the laws and
practices governing the business operations of the country in which
such firm is located. An issuer which demonstrates good faith efforts
to use such influence shall be conclusively presumed to have complied
with the requirements of paragraph (2).
(7) For the purpose of paragraph (2) of this subsection, the terms
"reasonable assurances" and "reasonable detail" mean such level of
detail and degree of assurance as would satisfy prudent officials in
the conduct of their own affairs.
https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol37/iss4/4
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amendments are important for several reasons. Paragraph 4 of this section limits criminal liability to the conditions of paragraph 5 which turns
on whether a party "knowingly circumvents" or "knowingly failed to
implement a system of internal accounting controls." The term "knowing"
requires a higher degree of culpability and replaces the concept of "reason
to know." "Knowing" is subsequently defined in a later section as:
2A. (i) if such person is aware that such person is engaging in such
conduct, that such circumstance exists or that such result is
substantially certain to occur; or
exists or
(ii) such person has a firm belief that such circumstance
42
that such result is substantially certain to occur.
However, there is substitute language which implicitly states a standard similar to the reason to know:
When knowledge of the existence of a particular circumstance
2B.
is required for an offense, such knowledge is established if a
person is aware of a high probability of the existence of such
actually believes that such
circumstance unless the person
43
circumstance does not exist.
Paragraph 6 requires that the issuer only use "good faith efforts ... to
' 44
the extent reasonable to persuade those in charge to comply." Reasonable

as defined in paragraph 7, means that "level of detail and degree of
as would satisfy prudent officials in the conduct of their own
assurance
45
affairs.
4
The question remains how this will be interpreted and prosecuted. 6
negli"'[slimple
that
stated
The House Senate Conference Committee
gence' or 'mere foolishness' is insufficient for liability, but liability cannot
be avoided by engaging in conscious disregard', 'willful blindness' or deliberate ignorance of the facts.' 4 7 Thus, the individual and corporation
enjoy greater latitude to rebut any circumstantial evidence to prove that
they did not know.
II. PERMISSIBLE PAYMENTS
The original FCPA prohibited payments to foreign officials by both
s
issuers and domestic concerns "to obtain retain or direct business,"4 and

42FCPAA,

15 U.S.C. § 78 dd-l(f)(2)(A) (1988).

Id. at § 78 dd-l(f)(2)(B).
4 Id. at § 78 m(b)(6).
41 Id. at § 78 m(b)(7).
4For a discussion of limited prosecution under previous law, see Kurkjian &
Kelly, supra note 12. Compare Pastin & Hooker, supranote 30 with Alpern, Moral

Dimensions of the ForeignCorruptPracticesAct: Comments on Pastin and Hooker,
BuSINESS ETHICS 468 (M. Hoffman & J. Moore eds. 1984).
41 H.R. CONF. REP_ No. 576, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 920, reprinted in 134 Cong.

Rec. H1863, H2116 (daily ed. April 20, 1988).
4"FCPA, 15 U.S.C. § 78 m(b) (1982).
Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1989
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also contained an exemption for officials who were performing functions
essentially "ministerial or clerical.."49 The OTCA abandons this approach
and adopts a more practical approach which contains an exemption for
"routine governmental action" which is specifically defined as those
actions "ordinarily and commonly performed" in such things as "obtaining
permits ... processing governmental papers such as visas, ... providing
police protection ...scheduling inspections ...providing phone services
..loading and unloading cargo ...protecting perishable products ...
"50

These complementary sections specifically exclude certain types of activity from the umbrella of routine governmental action. They do not
encompass:
any decision by a foreign official whether or on what terms, to
award new business to or to continue business with a particular
party, or any action taken by a foreign official involved in the
decisionmaking process to encourage a decision to award new
business to or continue business with a particular party.5'
Even with these amendments there remains ambiguity about what actions would fall into routine government action or "actions of a similar
52
nature."

III. THE ANTIBRIBERY AND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES

The aforementioned definition of "knowing '53 becomes relevant in this
antibribery section as well, although the basic definitions of what conduct
is unacceptable remain unchanged. However, the new law introduces
several specific affirmative defenses 54 which again serve to clarify and
aid the corporation or individual. The defenses available include that the
payment or offer "was lawful under the written laws and regulations of
that ...country" or that it was a "bona fide expenditure such as travel
or lodging... related to promotion ... of products ...or execution of a
contract . ...-55

Thus bringing officials to the United States to view a product system
would not be a bribe.

49

d.

- FCPAA, 15 U.S.C. § 78 dd-1 (b) and (f)(3)(A) (1988) ("issuers"); FCPAA, 15
U.S.C. § 78 dd-2 (b) and (n)(4)(A) (1988) ("domestic concerns").
51Id.
52/d.

-"Knowing" is defined for "issuers" at FCPAA, 15 U.S.C. § 78 dd-1 (f)(2)(A)
and (B) (1988); for "domestic concerns" at FCPAA, 15 U.S.C. § 78 dd-2 (h)(3)(A)
and (B) (1988).
FCPAA, 15 U.S.C. § 78 dd-1, (c) (1988) ("issuers"); FCPAA, 15 U.S.C. § 78
dd-2, (c) (1988) ("domestic concerns").
55

/d.

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol37/iss4/4

6

FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT

1989]

IV. PENALTIES

The penalties in the amendments have been considerably strengthened.
A comparison helps to illustrate:
1988

1977
$1 million corporate
$10,000 individual
5 years prison

$2,000,000 issuer/domestic concern
$100,000 individual
56
5 years prison

While the prison terms remain the same, the amendments target fines
as a way of increasing compliance with the new law.
V. EXECUTIVE BRANCH RESPONSIBILITIES
The OTCA contains a provision under which the U.S. Attorney General
is obligated to determine whether guidelines for the business community
57
would enhance compliance. If it is determined that the corporate community would benefit from such guidelines, the U.S. Attorney General
would issue guidelines describing "common types of export sales arrangements" and "general precautionary procedures.

58

1

However, as of June

15, 1990, the Fraud Section of the Attorney General's office had no plans
to issue any guidelines.9
an opinion from
There is also a provision that companies may request
60
provision esThis
the Attorney General regarding prospective conduct.
out in concarried
conduct
that
tablishes a "rebuttable presumption"
may
presumption
The
legal.
is
request
the
in
detailed
that
formance with
61
be rebutted by a "preponderance of the evidence." Confidentiality is
guaranteed6 2 thus eliminating a weakness with the original law.

56FCPAA, 15 U.S.C. § 78 dd-1 (b) (1988) ("issuers"); FCPAA, 15 U.S.C. § 78
dd-2 (g) (1988) ("domestic concerns").
I FCPAA, 15 U.S.C. § 78 dd-1 (d) (1988) ("issuers"); FCPAA, 15 U.S.C. § 78
dd-2 (e) (1988) ("domestic concerns").
58

Id.

19Telephone interview with U.S. Attorney General's fraud division lawyer who
wished to remain anonymous (June 6, 1989). The lawyer stated that there was
great difficulty in defining and consequently writing any specific behavior to
include in guidelines.
FCPAA, 15 U.S.C. § 78 dd-1 (e) (1988) ("issuers"); FCPAA, 15 U.S.C. § 78
dd-2 (f)(1988) ("domestic concerns"). The original FCPA contained a similar provision. FCPA, 15 U.S.C. § 78 m(b) (1982).
61FCPAA, 15 U.S.C. § 78 dd-1 (e) (1988) ("issuers"); FCPAA, 15 U.S.C. § 78
(f) (1988) ("domestic concerns").
dd-2
62

Id.
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Congress urged the President in section (d) to "pursue the negotiation
of an international agreement. 6 3 The President is to report to Congress:
(1) the progress
(2) alternative
(3) impact on U.S. when companies from other countries engage in
bribery
6

(4) legislative recommendations.

4

Presumably Congress will reevaluate the FCPA on an ongoing basis
thereafter.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
The clarification in the OTCA of the FCPA was necessary for business
to be on notice of what specific acts constitute illegal corporate conduct.
Although there is no hard data on the amount of business lost because
of the preexisting law, there may be some available after the 1989 report
by the President. Many commentators have long called for amendments
similar to those just passed, while others have lamented the watering
down of a law imposing ethical behavior on corporations and individuals."s
What remains to be seen is whether in another few years the FCPA will
be remembered as "the high water mark of American Paternalism. '' 66

FCPAA, 15 U.S.C. § 78 dd-2 (d) (1988).
- Id.

See generally sources cited supra notes 9, 11, 12 and 46.
Hirschhorn, supra note 9, at 16.
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